Pappada, F., "The Dynamics of Informality and Fiscal Policy under Sovereign Risk"

Title: "The Dynamics of Informality and Fiscal Policy under Sovereign Risk"

Speaker: Assistant Professor Francesco Pappada, Ca Foscari University of Venice

Host:  Assistant Professor Kospentaris Ioannis, Department of Economics, Athens University of Economics and Business

Time: 15.30 -17.00

Room:  76, Patission Str., Antoniadou Wing, 3rd floor, Room A36

Attachments:  PDF of Relevant Paper

Abstract: This paper examines how the dynamics of informality affects optimal fiscal policy and default risk. We build a model of sovereign debt with limited commitment and informality to assess the consequences of dynamic distortions induced by fiscal policy. In the model, fiscal policy has a persistent impact on taxable activity, which affects future fiscal revenues and thus default risk. The interaction of tax distortions and limited commitment strongly constrains the dynamics of optimal fiscal policy and leads to (i) more frequent default episodes and (ii) costly fluctuations in consumption