Velez, R., "Revealed Implementation"

Title: "Revealed Implementation"

Speaker: Professor Rodrigo Velez, University of Texas at San Antonio

Host:  Assistant Professor Efthymios Athanasiou, Department of Economics, Athens University of Economics and Business

Room:  76, Patission Str., Derigny Wing, 4th floor, Room D4

Abstract: We introduce a statistical theory of implementation. We develop a canonical statistic and study its connection to the stability of theoretical predictions. For dominant-strategy mechanisms, ex-post best response rates are sufficient if and only if every BNE performs. Our theory allows us to articulate ancillary assumptions and translates testing into a program. We compute our two central objects of analysis, the minimal sufficient threshold and the maximal observable performance functions, for a second-price auction at the size of Andreoni et al. (2007), four bidders, 101 types, 201 bids.