Spring Semester 2025-2026
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Date:11/06/2026 - 15:30 to 16:45
Title: "Democracy, redistribution, and economic growth: Some evidence from post-1974 Greece"
Speaker: Professor Emeritus George C. Bitros, Department of Economics, Athens University of Economics and Business
Host: Assistant Professor Efthymios Athanasiou, Department of Economics, Athens University of Economics and Business
Room: 76, Patission Str., Antoniadou Wing, 3rd floor, Room A36
Abstract: In the post-war period, Greece experienced two distinct phases of economic growth. From 1954 to 1974, the average annual growth rate was close to 7%. However, from 1975 to 2023, this rate plummeted to less than 1%. This paper aims to explore the reasons behind this stark asymmetry. By utilizing annual data from reputable international databases that span from 1995 to 2023, the estimated dynamic ARDL model reveals that the decline in economic growth after 1974 can largely be attributed to a range of redistribution policies implemented under the guise of promoting “social rights”. These policies were expected to discourage saving, diminish investment, suppress risk-taking and entrepreneurship, and incentivize businesses and professionals to relocate abroad. Unfortunately, this is precisely what transpired. While the rationale of fostering “social rights” was used to garner public support and maintain political stability, the primary objective of the political order established under the 1975 Constitution was the expansion of the state. This expansion is reflected in the rise of general government expenditure from 24.1% of GDP in 1974 to 52.3% in 2023.To achieve large-scale redistribution, governments consistently hindered economic growth by increasing taxes on income and wealth, imposing heavy value-added taxes, and expanding employment in the public sector, ostensibly to prevent a dramatic rise in unemployment. To restore economic growth while also strengthening democracy, I recommend reverting to the provisions and institutional arrangements of the 1952 Constitution. Alternatively, the adoption of the new constitution recently proposed by six eminent Greek citizens may prove even more beneficial.
Attachments:
PDF of Relevant Paper -
Date:22/06/2026 - 10:30 to 11:45
Monday, 22 June 2026
Title: "Unawareness without the postulate of the excluded middle"
Speaker: Professor John Quiggin, Professor of Economics, University of Queensland
Host: Professor Dr. Phoebe Koundouri, Department of International & European Economic Studies, Athens University of Economics and Business
Room: 76, Patission Str., Antoniadou Wing, 3rd floor, Room A36
Abstract: The question of how to represent unawareness of possibilities relevant to a decision remains problematic despite decades of work on the topic. The proposed response in this paper is to reject the "postulate of the excluded middle", which states that if a proposition is not true, its negation must be true The rejection of the excluded middle postulate means that the language may be represented by a Heyting algebra rather than the usual Boolean algebra. The Heyting algebra is not closed under negation, but gives rise to a pseudocomplement. The rejection of the excluded middle allows for more realistic representations of incomplete contracts and financial markets.
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Date:26/06/2026 - 15:00 to 16:15
Title: "Dynamic (un)structured bargaining in the lab"Speaker: Assistant Professor Philippos Louis, University of Cyprus
Host: Assistant Professor Efthymios Athanasiou, Department of Economics, Athens University of Economics and Business
Room: 76, Patission Str., Antoniadou Wing, 3rd floor, Room A36
Abstract: We study how adding structure to bargaining changes both outcomes and behavior, bridging the experimental literatures on unstructured negotiation and tightly structured bargaining games. In an in-person lab experiment, pairs bargain dynamically under a deadline over a finite set of contracts with complete information. Holding this environment constant, we compare three processes: Unstructured Bargaining (UB), Alternating Offers (AO), and Voting with Alternating Offers and Vetoes (VAOV). We find that appropriately combining structural elements can mitigate disagreement—VAOV yields lower disagreement than AO, especially in later rounds—yet introduces a tradeoff: conditional on agreement, reaching “good” (efficient) agreements becomes harder, with VAOV exhibiting more inefficient outcomes. Behavior adjusts to the imposed rules in non-monotonic ways, with proposal activity and dynamics differing sharply across structures. The results highlight tensions between steering parties toward agreement and increasing cognitive and strategic demands, which are relevant from an economic design perspective.
